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Do SocioeconomicRegulationsDiscriminate
againstSmall Firms?*
TRAN HUU DUNG
ROBERT PREMUS
StateUniversity
Wright
Dayton,Ohio

I. Introduction
laws subjectall government
and subcontractors
to a complex
Federalprocurement
contractors
maze of whathavebecomeknownas socioeconomic
these
regulations.
Purportedly, regulations
are a meansby whichthegovernment
can use itspoweras a largebuyer-sometimestheonly
a varietyof social policies,such as inbuyer-to forcethebusinesssectorto helpimplement
for
the
and theminorities,
creasingemployment
handicapped
raisingwage rates
opportunities
in some specificindustries,
small
business
creation,reducingregionalinequalities,
stimulating
andnumerous
no
others.In all, thereare currently
decreasingnationaldependenceon imports,
ofFederalLaw andmorethan64,000 pagesofregulations
fewerthan4,000 provisions
affecting
procurement.
Actof 1973which,in mostrespects,is a protoConsider,forinstance,theRehabilitation
for
Aimedat expanding
employment
opportunities
typeof 37 majorsocioeconomicregulations.
andservicesto theFederalgovernthisactrequiresbusinessessellingproducts
thehandicapped,
suchas job restructuring,
mentto make"reasonableaccommodations,"
physicalaccess,andjob
in
and
to
do
so
loss
ofFederalcontracts
for
the
Failure
could
result
the
counseling
handicapped.
possiblycourtlitigation.
Act unfairly
Accordingto its critics,theRehabilitation
imposesadditionalcosts of hiring
in theFederalcontractmarket.
and training
thehandicappedworkers
ontofirmsparticipating
the
of
nor
Act
does
not
an
estimate
costs
an
assessment
of theabilityof firms
(In fact,
require
to pay.)Moreover,thecriticscontendthatthesocioeconomic
regulations
place smallfirmsat a
relativeto largefirms,
a consequence
thatappearsto runcounterto othereconomic
disadvantage
objectives.
Severalreasonshavebeen citedto supportthislattercontention.
First,largefirmssupply
to
the
Federal
The
MX
submarine,
uniqueproducts
government. Stealthbomber, missile,Trident
and space shuttle
areexamplesofuniqueproducts
fromthelargebusinesssector.With
procured
theirstrongmarketpower,thesebusinessesare in a betterpositionto pass theadditionalcosts
of hiringthehandicapped
ontotheirsuppliers,
orboth.Second,largefirms
thegeneraltaxpayer,
*An earlierversionof thispaperwas presented
at theSouthern
EconomicAssociationmeetingin San Antonio,
November1988. We wouldliketo thankEverett
Whiteandan anonymous
referee
fortheirusefulcomments
and suggestions.Of course,responsibility
foranyerrorsis oursalone.
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aremorelikelyto be in a positionto makebetter
use ofthespecializedskillsofthehandicapped.
ofphysicalaccommodations
and supportive
services
Finally,economiesof scale in theprovision
to aid thehandicapped
maybe present.Thus,thenetperpersoncostof hiringthehandicapped
is likelyto be lowerforlargefirms
thanit is forsmallerfirms.
In contrast
to thesepopulararguments,
a surveyconducted
JointEcobytheCongressional
nomicCommittee
(JEC)' providedsomelimitedevidencethatsmallfirmsmayactuallybenefit
fromsocioeconomicregulations.
Based upona 1979-80questionnaire
surveyof 2,530 Federal
to which766 companiesresponded,
theJEC studyshowsthata majority
contractors,
(65%) of
smallfirms
that
their
remained
reported
profit
margins
adequateorwereactuallybetterthanthey
theprocurement
market.
expectedpriorto entering
The principalobjectiveofthispaperis to subjecttheissueofa possiblesmallbusinessbias
fromtheimposition
of socioeconomic
to rigoroustheoretical
resulting
regulations
analysis.In
view of thefactthatmostof thecriticisms
of theseregulations
are based on theobservationwhichwe believeto be accurate-thattheaffected
industries
aretypically
withhigh
oligopolistic
barriers
and
firms
of
we
will
focus
our
attention
on
this
case.
It
outthat
turns
sizes,
entry
unequal
thesimplersituation,
whenfirms
areatomistic
is
a
case
of
our
model.
price-takers, special
We employtheconjectural
variations
interactions.
This apapproachto modeloligopolistic
in recentyears2because
literature
proachhas becomeverypopularin theindustrial
organization
it allowsgreatflexibility-perfect
and monopolistic
can all
competition,
monopoly,
competition
be consideredspecialcases of conjectural
variations.
Two alternative
are
parameters chosenas
shareandthedegreeofeconomiesofscale.
proxiesforfirmsize: market
Severalsurprising
resultsemerge.First,whenfactorsubstitution
is possible,some socioeconomicregulations
can actuallyhaveconsequences
diametrically
opposedto whatis intended.
it
is
not
true
that
these
hurt
is a
Second,
(unlesstheindustry
necessarily
regulations theindustry
Andthird,
evenwhentheseregulations
lowerindustry
small
monopolyor is competitive).
profits,
firmscouldcomeoutahead,absolutely
as wellas relatively,
is nottoo
providedthattheindustry
collusive.
It mustbe mentioned,
thatourmodeldoes nottakeintoaccountadministration
however,
andmonitoring
costs.Thisomissionis relatively
harmless
as ourmainintention
is notto compare
administration
and monitoring
alternative
policieswhichmayhavedifferent
costs,butratherto
taskof examining
theimpactof a typicalsocioeconomicregulation
on
pursuetheless ambitious
firms
of unequalsizes.
The paperis organizedas follows.SectionII setsup thebasic modelusingstylizedclauses
of theRehabilitation
Actas examplesof socioeconomic
SectionIII showshow emregulations.
and
are
affected
the
Section
IV
examines
how profits
of small
ployment output
by
regulations.
and largefirmsare affected
in an oligopolistic
framework.
Resultsof a numerical
simulation
for
variousmarket
structures
arereported
in sectionV. A summary
andimplications
arepresented
in
sectionVI.

II. The Basic Model
Consideran industry
of two firms(whichcould be of unequalsizes) producinga
consisting
The analysiscan be easilyextendedto thecase of n > 2 firms.Call
homogeneous
commodity.
1. See Premus,et al. [7]. Thisstudywas partially
fundedbya grantfromtheSmallBusinessAdministration.
2. The mainreferences
areDixit[1], KatzandRosen[3], Perry[6], Seade [9], andStern[10].
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andP(Q) theinverse
qi theoutputof firmi (i = 1,2), Q (=qi + q2) theoutputoftheindustry,
market
demandfunction,
withP' < 0.
Let qi = F (Ki,Li) be the production
function
and
(continuousand twice differentiable,
concave-thelattercondition
on F ensuressatisfaction
of second-order
coneverywhere
strictly
ditionsforprofit
whichis thesameforbothfirms,
whereKi is capitalandLi is
maximization),
labor.Li is measuredin efficiency
unitswhich,forconvenience,
are chosento be equal to one
man-hour
of non-handicapped
labor.Supposethatone man-hour
ofhandicapped
laboris equivalentto a man-hour
of non-handicapped
laborfortheparticular
kindof production
in question.
Thus,
Li = Ni + aN[,

whereNi andN[ denotethenumberof non-handicapped
andhandicapped
workers
respectively.
<
We assumethata
thereis no reasonforthefirmto treathandicapped
and non1; otherwise
evenin theabsenceof regulation.
It mustbe recognizedthat
handicappedworkersdifferently,
a maybe equal or greaterthanunityin somelinesof work.In otherwords,we focusonlyon
situations
wherehandicappedworkers
are less efficient
thannon-handicapped
without
workers,
thatthisis alwaysthecase.
suggesting
The firmis assumedto maximizeitstotalprofit
bychoosingKi, Ni, andNf, subjectto the
to
which
no
less
than
a
certain
fraction
must
(1)
regulation
according
(k) of a firm'semployment
be handicapped;
and(2) handicapped
andnon-handicapped
workers
mustbe paidthesamewage,
w perworker
perhour.
theproblemfacingthefirm
i is:
Formally,
maxPF(Ki, Li) - w(Ni + N[) - rKi

(1)

subjectto

2 k(Ni + N ).
(2)
Nibut not to overfulfill,
the handicappedrequirement,
Assumingthatfirmschoose to satisfy,
associatedwith(1) and(2) is
(2) holdswithequality.The Lagrangian
Y = PF(Ki,Li) - w(Ni + N[) - rKi - A[N*- k(Ni + N )].

(3)

Beforeproceeding
withthemaximization,
notethata(PF(xl, x2))/axi can be written
as:
a(PF(xl,x2))/axi = PFi + qi[aP/axi],

(4)

whereFi denotesaF(xl, x2)/axi, themarginal
ofF. The secondtermon therighthand
products
sideof (4) can be rewritten
as qivi[aP/aQ]Fi = qiviP'Fi, wherevi - dQ/dqi is theconjectural
of firmi. Thisparameter
firmi's beliefas to howtheindustry
reflects
(output)variation
output
wouldchangeifitchangesitsoutput.Iffirm
i is a pricetaker(as inperfect
competition),
vi = 0;
if it adoptsCournotconjecture,
collusivevi = 2.3 Thus, vi can be
vi = 1, and ifit is perfectly
3. In fact,sinceconjectural
variations
acrossfirms
of outputas well as
maydiffer
(theycan be madea function
numberof firms),theconjectural
variations
approachcan also be used to modelan asymmetric
oligopolysuch as the
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collusionandvi E [0, 2]
as an indexofcollusionwitha highervi representing
greater
interpreted
the
reasonable
range.
being
conditionsforprofitmaximization
The first-order
Li =
(makinguse of the relationship
Ni + aNi*) are:

FK(P + qiviP') = r,

(5a)

FN(P + qiviP') = w - Ak,

(5b)

FN*(P + qiviP') = w + A(1 - k),

(5c)

(1 - k)N = kNi.

(5d)

and

Noting thatFN* = aFN = aFL, (5b) and (5c) togetherimplythatA = w(a - 1)/[1 - k(1

- a)]. Thus,thesetwoconditions
can be replacedbya singlecondition:
FL(P + qiviP') = w - wk(a - 1)/[1 - k(l - a)],

or
= w/[1 - k(l - a)]

2 w.

(6)

is metexactly,an additionalefficiency
Whenthehandicapped
unitof labor,at the
requirement
be
divided
between
the
and
laborin the ratio
must
the
margin,
handicapped
non-handicapped
k/(1 - k). The cost of the marginalefficiencyunitof labor, w/[l - k(1 - a)], is the relevant

thehandicapped
actsas a taxon
requirement
priceof thecompositelaborinput.Putdifferently,
sinceFK/FL is independent
of vi, theleast-costcombination
of
laborinput.Not surprisingly,
does
on
the
of
market
collusion
the
firms.
not
degree output
among
depend
input
and Output
III. Handicapped Regulation,Employment,

ofa tightened
We can nowexaminetheeffects
(a higherk) on employrequirement
handicapped
mentand output.
PROPOSITIONI. For a given degree of collusion, the implementation
of any handicapped
results in an increase in the
regulationfrom an initial situationof no regulatoryenforcement
equilibriumN*. Successivelyhigherrequirements
mayeventuallylead to a reductionin equilibrium
N*.

on thederiveddemandforhandiThe handicapped
has twooffsetting
effects
requirement
fornon-handicapped
workers
to satisfytheregucappedworkers.Firmssubstitute
handicapped
lation,whileat thesametimetheysubstitute
capitalforthecompositelaborin responseto the
increasedcostofthecomposite
labor.Forsmallincreasesink fromzero,theformer
alwaysdomidominantfirmleadership.In thismodel,"thefringe"actsas a pricetakingfirmso itsconjecturalvariationis 1. The
a conjectural
variation
"dominant
firm,"on theotherhand,canbe showntoentertain
equal to es/[e - Of(1 - s)] where
shareof thedominant
of marketdemand,s is themarket
e is thepriceelasticity
firm,and Of is theconjecturalown
firmbeliefof howthefringefirmswillchangetheiroutputwhenthe
of fringesupply(i.e. thedominant
priceelasticity
firmchangesitsprice).
dominant
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nates.However,as k is increasedfurther,
thelattereffect
increasesin importance,
and dNi"*dk
turn
the
total
of
to
the
may
negative.Nonetheless,
response handicapped
employment
implementationof therequirement
of anymagnitude,
froman initialsituation
of no requirement,
mustbe
positive.
One important
of handicapped
questionis theextentto whichtheeffectiveness
requirement
on
the
of
collusion
firms.
To
answer
this
we differentiate
depends
degree
among
question,
dN*/dk
withrespectto vi:
a[dNi/dk]/avi

< 0.

Recallingthatfirmi becomesmorecollusiveas vi becomeslarger,we have:
PROPOSITION II. Themorecollusive
theindustry,
thelesseffective
willbe an increasein the
inraisinghandicapped
handicapped
requirement
employment.

PROPOSITIONIII.

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

d(N + N*)/dk< 0,
dN/dk < 0,
sgn(dK/dk) = -(sgnFKL), and
sgn(dF/dk) = sgn(FLFKK- FKFKL).

(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
(7d)

to (a) and(b), a higherhandicapped
wouldcausebothtotalemployAccording
requirement
mentandemployment
ofnon-handicapped
laborto drop.According
to (c) and(d), theeffects
of
a higherhandicapped
on
and
total
are
requirement capitalusage
output ambiguous.
Successiveincreasesin thehandicapped
raisethe priceof compositelabor,
requirement
whichis usedto determine
derivedlabordemand.Thus,usageofcompositelabormustfallwith
increasesin k becauseownpriceeffects
are necessarily
negativeforfactordemands.It follows
that
which
fora decliningfraction
accounts
of the
immediately non-handicapped
employment,
must
also be a decreasing
function
ofk. As theeffective
total,
ever-shrinking
priceof laborrises
withk, thecapitalusage increasesifcapitaland laborare substitutes
in production
(FKL < 0),
butfallsiftheyarecomplements
(FKL> 0). Finally,outputfallswithincreasesin k unlesslabor
is an inferior
is interpreted
input,i.e., unless(FLFKK - FKFKL) > 0. In words,thiscondition
as requiring
thattheproportional
decreasein themarginalphysicalproductsas a resultof an
increasein capitalinputbe greater
forlaborthanforcapital.Thispossibility
is precludediflabor
andcapitalarecomplements
in production.
IV. HandicappedRegulationand Profits
We turnnowto theeffects
ofhandicapped
on a firm's
It is convenient,
withno
regulation
profits.
loss of generality,
to workdirectly
withthecostfunction
C(q, k) of each firm.It is assumedthat
thetwofirms
haveidentical
costfunctions,
hencethesubscripts
aresuppressed.
As ourinterest
is
in thedependenceof theseeffects
on thefirm'ssize, we willspecifically
addresstheissue:how
will a smallincreasein thehandicapped
affecttheprofits
of firmswhen(1) their
requirement
sizes arenotequal, and(2) theyhavedifferent
degreesofeconomiesof scale?
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UnequalFirmSizes
Suppose thatthemarketsharesof thesetwofirmsare initially
si
of firmi is
function
profit

qi/(qi + q2), i = 1,2. The

Hi = Pqi - C.

(8)

(8) andsubstituting
Totallydifferentiating
yields
dHi = qidP + Cqdqi + qiviP'dqi - dC,

(9)

whereCq = aC/aqi andP' = dP/dQ.
i that
Using(9) and(5), itcan be readilydeducedforfirm
dHi/dk

= {(P - Cq + QP')/[(1 + sivi)P'/si + viP" - Cqq]}

-

CkCqk,

(10)

whereCqq = cCq/cqi, P" = dP'/dQ, Ck = aC/ak, andCqk = aCqlak.
The secondtermon therighthandside of (10) is positiveby assumption.It represents
the directeffectof the shiftin theprofitfunction
caused by an increasein the handicapped
first
term
on
the
The
hand
side
theindirect
effect
of theshiftin the
right
requirement.
represents
whichinturnchangestheduopolyequilibrium.
The denominator
ofthe
function,
marginalprofit
is tohold,4butthenumerator
first
termis negativeifstability
can be ofeithersign.
resultsemerge.First,an increasein thehandicapped
Severalinteresting
could
requirement
of thefirmifthefirst
termis positiveandlargeenoughto swampthesecond
increasetheprofits
term.This is one of themostremarkable
resultsin oligopolytheoryin generaland conjectural
variation
modelsin particular.5
an increasein themarket
shareof a firmwill makeit less
Second,and moresurprisingly,
that
will
benefit
from
an
increase
k.
from
in Indeed,
equation(10) we can determine
likely thefirm
a criticalmarket
shareabovewhicha firm
willbe hurtbythehandicapped
andbelow
requirement,
willraisetheprofits
ofthefirm,
whichthehandicapped
ceterisparibus.Thatis,
requirement
dlIi/dk > 0

if si < si*,

where
si = P'(Ck - qiCqk)/{Cqk(P

- Cq) + Ck[Cqq - Vi(P' - P")p}.

(11)

in
Summing
up, we findthatthehandicapped
requirement
mayturnoutto be discriminatory
thathavethesmallermarket
shares.Thissurprising
withtheJEC
result,consistent
favorof firms
has a fundamental
connection
witha similarresultin thetheory
of horizontal
findings,
mergers.
As Stigler[11] and others(e.g., Salantet al. [8]) haveargued,firmswhichdo notparticipate
in a mergermaybenefitmorethantheparticipants.
The reasonis thatthe post-merger
firm
will typically
reduceitsproduction
belowthecombinedoutputof itsconstituent
firms,causing
willthenexpandoutputand profit
undertheumbrellaof
industry
priceto rise.Nonparticipants
ofthestability
discussion
condition.
4. See Seade [9] fora thorough
5. See Dixit[1], Katz andRosen[3], Levin[4], andStern[10].
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DegreeofCollusion
Perfect A
Collusion2

C

Cournot1--------------------

Perfect

Competition
0

Market
shareof
1
firm

0.5 -

0

Market
shareof
firm
2

Figure1.

thehigherindustry
thatresult
do notcaptureall of theprofits
price.Thus,mergerparticipants
froma merger.
A similarresultoccursinourmodelwhen,givenindustry
an exogenous
structure,
fromtheimposition
ofthehandicapped
changein costsresulting
requirement
putsthelargefirms
in a disadvantageous
positionvis-a-vissmallfirms.6
theresults.The cross-hatched
areabelowAB containsthe(vl,sl) comFigure1 illustrates
binations
1
to theinitial
for
firm
to
from
ink. LineAB corresponds
benefit
an
increase
necessary
value of k equal to zero. The highertheinitialvalueof k is fromzero, thegreaterwill be the
the(vl,sl) combinations
necessaryforfirm1 to benefit
upwardshiftin theAB line,enlarging
from
froman increasein k. Line CD is thecounterpart
oflineAB forfirm2. Firm2 willbenefit
an increasein thehandicapped
if
falls
into
the
area
to
the
southeast
of
CD.
(v2,
S2)
requirement
couldlose andthe
It is obviousfromFigure1 thatseveraloutcomesarepossible:(1) onefirm
couldgain,or (3) bothfirms
foranydegree
othergain,(2) bothfirms
couldlose. Nevertheless,
of collusion,thesmallerfirms
are morelikelyto gain.Withenoughcollusion,and ifbothfirms
are similarin size, theymaybothgainfromtheregulatory
requirement.
Different
DegreesofEconomiesofScale
be affected
The abilityoffirms
tobeartheregulatory
costsshouldalso presumably
byeconomies
we assumethatthetwo
of scale. To focuson theeffects
of economiesof scale of theindustry,
firmshaveequal marketshares,si = s2 = 0.5. Thisrestriction
assumesthateconomiesof scale
ofeconomiesof scale to be
dependonlyon industry
output.Next,we definetheelasticity
0 = C/qiCq.

(12)

In general,0 willbe greater
thanunity,
orsmallerthanunitywhenthereareeconomies
unity,
of scale, no economiesof scale,anddiseconomies
of scale,respectively.
6. Fora detailedanalysisoftheconnection
andhorizontal
betweenconjectural
variations
see Dung [2].
mergers,
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DegreeofCollusion
Perfect
Collusion2
M

Cournot1

Perfect
Competition

N

Scale
Economies

Figure2.

Using(5), (9) and(12) we have:
dHi/dk = {(P - 2C/QO + QP')/[(2 + vi)P' + viP" - Cqq]} - Ck/Cqk.

(13)

The resultyieldedby(13) is also counterintuitive.
Itsaysthatthegreater
thedegreeofeconomies of scale, thesmallerthelikelihoodthata firmcould perversely
benefitfroman increase
in thehandicapped
An explanation
of theresultcan be offered
requirement.
alongthefollowing
lines. Because industry
declines
as
the
is
economies
increased,
output
handicapped
requirement
of scale lose someof theiradvantage.The greater
theinitialeconomiesof scale, themorepronouncedwill be theloss of advantagefollowing
a tightening
of thehandicappedrequirement,
and themorelikelythefirmwillbe hurtbythehandicapped
requirement.
Again,we can easily
the
critical
value
of
above
which
the
willlowerthe
compute
handicapped
requirement
0, say0",
of
the
firm.
profits
Formally:
dH/ldk >O

if 0 < 0*",

where
0* = CqkC/{Cqk[P

+ QP"] - Ck[(2 + vi)P' + viP" - Cqq]}.

(14)

thiscase. LineMN (corresponding
to someinitialvalueofk) dividesthe
Figure2 illustrates
thatwould
(v, 6)-spaceintotwoareas:To theleft(right)ofthislinearethe(vi,6) combinations
allow thefirmto gain(lose) froma smallincreasein k. Higherinitialvaluesof k will shiftthe
MN lineto theright.
does discriminate
Summing
up thissection,we findthatthehandicapped
requirement
among
on thebasisof size. The surprise
firms
is thatsmallerfirms
withno economiesor evendiseconomiesof scale arenotnecessarily
thepartyworseoff.
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Table I. CriticalValuesof MarketSharesi (vi)

vi

k= 0

k = 5%

k = 10%

k = 15%

k = 20%

.000

3.125

3.145

3.165

3.185

3.205

.100

3.049

3.067

3.086

3.106

3.125

.300
.400
.500

2.907
2.841
2.778

2.717
2.660
2.604
2.551
2.500
2.451
2.404
2.358
2.315
2.273
2.232
2.193
2.155
2.119

2.941
2.874
2.809

2.959
2.890
2.825

2.976
2.907
2.841

.600
.700
.800
.900
1.000
1.100
1.200
1.300
1.400
1.500
1.600
1.700
1.800
1.900

2.924
2.857
2.793

2.000

2.083

2.092

2.101

2.110

2.119

.200

2.976

2.994

2.732
2.674
2.618
2.564
2.513
2.463
2.415
2.370
2.326
2.283
2.242
2.203
2.165
2.128

3.012

2.747
2.688
2.632
2.577
2.525
2.475
2.427
2.381
2.336
2.294
2.252
2.212
2.174
2.137

3.030

2.762
2.703
2.646
2.591
2.538
2.488
2.439
2.392
2.347
2.304
2.262
2.222
2.183
2.146

3.049

2.778
2.717
2.660
2.604
2.551
2.500
2.451
2.404
2.358
2.315
2.273
2.232
2.193
2.155

V. NumericalExample
To gain additionalinsights
intotheresults,we conducta numerical
analysisusingspecificcost
and demandfunctions.
concensus,7we employlinear
Followingthewell-established
professional
ofactualdemandandcostconditions.
costfunctions
as first
demandandquadratic
approximations
let
Specifically,
C = (1 + k)q2

and
P = 20 - 8Q,

whereQ = qi + q2.
Table I reportsthevaluesof si*computedfromequation(11). Recall thatv indicatesthe
to +2 (forperfect
collusion);
competition)
degreeof collusion,whichrangesfrom0 (forperfect
The bodyof the
to totalemployment.
workers
and k is theinitialrequiredratioof handicapped
sharesi*forthecorresponding
tablegivesthecriticalvaluesof market
pairof (vi,ki).
We notethatin thisexamplethecriticalmarketshareforany combination
(vi,ki) is not
to theinitiallevelof thehandicappedrequirement
(k). Of
verylargeand is ratherinsensitive
sizeable annualsales for
course,marketsharein theone to threepercentrangecan represent
contractors.
manygovernment
wederivedinprevioussections
thattheresults
7. See, forinstance,KatzandRosen[3]. Itmustbe noted,however,
in thissectionas an exampleonly.
areemployed
arequitegeneral.The specificfunctions
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Table II. CriticalValuesof Scale Economies0*(vi)

vi

k= 0

k = 5%

k = 10%

k = 15%

k = 20%

.000
.100
.200
.300
.400
.500
.600
.700
.800

.02632
.02577
.02525
.02475
.02427
.02381
.02336
.02294
.02252

.02692
.02636
.02581
.02529
.02479
.02431
.02384
.02340
.02297

.02750
.02691
.02634
.02580
.02528
.02477
.02429
.02383
.02338

.02805
.02743
.02684
.02628
.02574
.02522
.02472
.02424
.02378

.02857
.02793
.02732
.02674
.02618
.02564
.02513
.02463
.02415

1.000
1.100
1.200
1.300

.02174
.02137
.02101
.02066

.02215
.02177
.02139
.02103

.02254
.02214
.02176
.02138

.02291
.02250
.02210
.02171

.02326
.02283
.02242
.02203

.02030

.02058

.900

1.400
1.500
1.600
1.700

1.800

1.900
2.000

.02212

.02033
.02000
.01969
.01938

.01908
.01880
.01852

.02255

.02069
.02035
.02002
.01971

.01940
.01910
.01882

.02295

.02102
.02068
.02034
.02001

.01970
.01939
.01910

.02334

.02134
.02099
.02064
.01998
.01966
.01936

.02370

.02165
.02128
.02092
.02024
.01992
.01961

as in thepreviouscase, we can also computethecritical
Usingthesame specificfunctions
of
scale
economies
0*
as
givenby equation(14). The resultsare exhibitedin Table II,
degree
whichshowsthecriticalvalueofthedegreeofeconomiesof scale abovewhicha tightening
in k
willlowerfirmprofit.
The moststriking
observation
fromTableII is thatthefirmsneed nothave economiesof
of the handicappedrequirement.
scale to benefitfromenforcement
forany given
Evidently,
on whether
concentration
a firmbenefits
or is hurt
ratio,economiesofscalewillhavelittleeffect
Of moreimportance
is thedegreeofcollusionamongfirms:
theless collusive
bytheregulations.
thefirms,thehigherwill be thecriticalscale economies,i.e., theless likelythatthefirmwill
benefit
froman increaseinthehandicapped
In fact,thislikelihood
becomesstronger
requirement.
thehighertheinitialvalueofk.

VI. Summary and Implications

In thispaperwe useda conjectural
variations
modeltoanalyzetheeffects
ofsomestylizedclauses
Actof 1973.Somenoteworthy
oftheRehabilitation
conclusions
werereached.
an increaseinthehandicapped
First,becauseofinputsubstitutability,
requirement
(beyonda
certainlevel)was shownto actuallyreducetotalemployment.8
initiatives
to
Thus,administrative
enforcement
andgettoughwithviolators
tighten-up
mayactuallyproducesomecounterproductive
Levin [3] discoveredthattaxationto controlpollutioncould actuallycreatemore
8. In a similarframework,
industry.
pollutionin an oligopolistic
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results.In anycase, theanalysissuggests
thatanyregulatory
efforts
to createemployment
forthe
should
consider
on
the
less
collusive
of
the
market.
handicapped
focusing
segment
procurement
Thisfinding
castssomedoubton theeffectiveness
ofcurrent
enforcement
efforts
practicewhereby
on themoreoligopolistic
industries.
It mustbe reiterated,
however,that
appearto concentrate
whenadministrative
andmonitoring
costsaretakenintoaccount,andespeciallywhensocietyhas
othergoals,selectiveenforcement
on largerfirms
byconcentrating
maybe justified.
if
Even it succeedsin creating
morejobs forhandicapped
thesocioeconomicreworkers,
extranormal
as outputand priceare nudgedcloserto
quirement
mayincreaseindustry
profits
theircartellevels.Thus,insteadofusingitsmonopsony
powerto forcefirmsin theprocurement
marketto pay forsocioeconomic
the
programs, government
mayin effect
helpthesefirmsearn
thuspassingon thecostoftheseprograms
to othersectorsoftheeconomy.
higherprofits,
itis notnecessarily
truethatsmallerfirms,
orfirms
withdiseconomies
of
Equallyimportant,
in
a lossinprofits,
or
with
firms.
The
outcome
will
scale, willsuffer
absolutely comparison larger
smallfirms
could see theirprofit
dependon thedegreeof collusionin theindustry.
Specifically,
that"set asides" or
marginsincreasebymorethanthoseofthelargefirms.Thus,theargument
relief"shouldbe granted
to smallbusinessesto helpthemcope withvarious
special "regulatory
kindsof socioeconomic
shouldperhapsbe justified
on a case bycase basis.9,10
regulations
It is certainly
notourcontention
thattheFederalgovernment
shouldabandonitsresponsior in meeting
bilityto thehandicapped
anyoftheothersocial goalsas expressedin procurement
In viewof ourfindings,
a prudent
however,
regulations.
policywouldbe to consideralternative
means. For example,extending
the "equal protection
clause" of civilrightslegislationto the
assistanceto help
handicapped
population
maybe a moreeffective
approach.Directgovernment
trainandincreasetheemployability
ofthehandicapped
also deservesmoreseriousconsideration.
In thisregard,theTechnology-Related
AssistanceforIndividuals
WithDisabilitiesActof 1988,
in theHouse (HR.4904) and Senate(S.2561), holdsgreatpromise.Undertheproviintroduced
sionsoftheproposedAct,theFederalgovernment
wouldassumesomefinancial
for
responsibility
thedevelopment
andpurchaseoftechnology
barriers
specifically
designedtoremoveemployment
forthehandicapped.
9. Needlessto say,theremaybe other,better
reasonsto helpsmallbusinesses.
a non-regulated
10. See, e.g., Myles[5] foran analysiswhichincorporates
sector.
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